Taurus: The Untold Story

Introduction

All over the world, IEDs have emerged as a weapon of choice for terrorists. From the terrorist's point of view, the IED efficiently fulfills the strategic design of terrorism. Firstly, it creates a sensational impact, which the media reports and provides the perpetrator the publicity desired. Secondly, the suddenness and drama of an IED attack, creates fear and panic amongst the public at large, which is a strategic design. Thirdly, it is low-cost; both in terms of the material needed to assemble the IED and also in terms of danger to the terrorist. A terrorist can plant an IED, detonate the same remotely and walk away with minimum risk of exposure.

However, there are also vulnerabilities in a terrorist's IED campaign, which we as security forces should identify and target. Most terrorists, particularly those not specifically trained in explosives, are reluctant to deal with IEDs. Thus, for terror organizations, the 'TED Man' is a specialist and scarce and precious resource. To overcome their dependence on specialists, some terror organizations attempt to standardize the method to initiate IEDs.

During the period from 1998 to 2004, the Indian Army faced a serious challenge from Remote Controlled (RC) IEDs. The RC IEDs were of a standard design, easy to lay and even easier to initiate. The Indian Army's response to this challenge was professional and successful. Through technical innovation the Indian Army designed and fielded equipment that eliminated the RC IED threat. Recently, some senior officers from the Corps of Engineers suggested that it was time to declare the Taurus Counter IED equipment obsolete. I agree that if the threat has been eliminated, it is time to declare the equipment obsolete but l also realized that it was perhaps time to record, for posterity, the unusual and remarkable events that lead to the elimination of this threat, which were not disclosed so far, for security reasons.

PART 1: THE ADVENT OF REMOTE CONTROLLED (RC) IEDS

In 1995, the RC IEDs were making an increasing impact in J & K. During this period, I was posted at the Directorate General of Military Operations, popularly called the MO Directorate, as General Staff Officer. The MO Directorate is literally the 'brain centre' for all military operations activities, in our country.

I was proud and felt privileged to be a part of this very select professional body of officers for a period of three years. Service in the MO Directorate is a powerful experience; both in terms of knowledge and by association with the best contemporary military minds.

The RC IED was an IED that was initiated by radio waves; thus, the subject fell in the domain of Operation Directorates of both Engineers and Signals; each headed by exemplary officers. Engineer officers with education in civil, mechanical and electrical disciplines were not comfortable with radio waves and Signal officers with education in telecommunications though confident with radio waves, were not trained in explosives. Being a hybrid of two separate technology domains it needed, an innovative approach.

In May 2000, I took over command of 7 Engineer Regiment. It was a proud privilege to command my parent unit, which I had joined as a 2nd Lieutenant, 21 years earlier. Almost immediately after taking over command, senior officers from the MO Directorate visited me and suggested that I take up a project to find a technical solution to the challenge of the RC IEDs; for which I would receive direct support from the Army HQ. Within a few weeks, the DGMO visited my unit to discuss the project. Normally, the Army HQ does not deal directly with units. This unusual approach was perhaps recognition of the seriousness of the challenge and the need to adopt an innovative approach.

In August 2000, an RC IED killed two senior officers, when they were travelling in a vehicle, in Kupwara, J&K. The loss of senior officers was a painful reminder of the inadequacy of our response to meet the RC IED threat. In a subsequent visit of the DGMO, he reminded me of the urgency to find a solution. He pragmatically suggested that a partially effective solution, executable in weeks, may be preferable to a better solution, if it were to become available in months or years.

PART 2: THE PILOT INITIATIVE GROWS

Analysis of the Threat

The RC IEDs being deployed in J&K were of common design and operated in the Citizen Band spectrum, from 136 to 174 Mega Hertz. They came in brown colored tin boxes, the size of a student's pencil box. The device was powered by two standard pencil cells and each device could initiate two IEDs, separately. Each box was marked with a 10-digit code, which we were soon able to decipher. The first six digits depicted the frequency in Kilo Hertz that the device operated on; the subsequent two digits the DTMF (Dual Tone Multi Frequency), for initiating the first IED and the last two digits the DTMF code to initiate, the second IED. After an IED attack was carried out, Post Blast Investigations recovered many of the RC IED boxes.

The Army HQ issued instructions that all RC IED boxes were to be collected and dispatched to our regiment, for study. More than 100 boxes were received, primarily from J&K and some from Assam.

It was after a detailed study of the boxes that five independent approaches to a technological solution were evolved. Each approach, by itself could have yielded a workable solution. However to ensure success, all five approaches indicated below were independently pursued:-

Approach 1 : Targeting the spurious frequency. We discovered that when the battery was connected to the RC IED box, it emitted a spurious frequency. The emission was unintentional; probably a defect in design and it was also very faint. However, with a sensitive Spectrum Analyzer we learnt that the spurious frequency was a direct function of the operating frequency, of the RC IED. Thus, the first technical approach involved detection of the spurious frequency and determining the operating frequency of the RC IED box. Thereafter, there were two options available; we could successfully jam the device (prevent the terrorist from initiating the device) or pre-initiate the device ourselves.

(b) Approach 2: Pre-initiation. All the devices operated in the Citizen Band and on a specific operating frequency. Communication between a handheld radio set (with an alphanumeric pad) and the RC IED was established on the operating frequency and then the device was activated using a two-digit DTMF (Dual Tone Multi Frequency) code. DTMF codes are automatically generated, when keys of the alphanumeric pad are pressed.

The second approach we adopted was to generate all possible DTMF codes (00 to 99) on all the frequencies of the Citizen Band (approximately 3800 frequencies).

(c) Approach 3: Improved ASHI. Our third approach involved improving existing equipment ASHI, developed by 3 Army Base Workshop, in Northern Command. ASHI was also a pre-initiator, which generated harmonics in the Citizen Band. The harmonics facilitated the simultaneous transmission of DTM codes on multiple frequencies. Thus, in comparison to the second approach, the ASHI was smaller, cheaper and a mobile equipment. However, the ASHI had much smaller range and its range reduced significantly with discharge of it's battery. Our proposal was to introduce more hardware into the ASHI and increase the output power being transmitted into the Citizen Band spectrum.

(d) Approach

4: Reactive Jamming & Pre- initiation. Our fourth approach was perhaps the most interesting and innovative. It involved the use of a sensitive Spectrum Analyzer, to monitor the Citizen Band for DTMF codes. If a DMF code were detected, a jamming signal on the carrier frequency would be automatically initiated, in less than two seconds. The RC IED boxes, as mentioned earlier, had a two-digit code and the first digit was required to be pressed for four to six seconds before the second digit.

Thus, the two second reaction time was adequate to prevent a terrorist from initiating the RC IED.

Unlike normal barrage jammers, the reactive jammer would also warn security forces about the presence of the RC IED; as the equipment would activate only when a terrorist's DTMF signal was detected. From the security forces point of view, the equipment should be mounted in a vehicle and used for clearing road axes. The instant the reactive jammer issued a jamming signal, security forces stand warned about the presence of an IED, which was temporarily incapacitated. The Security Forces now had the option to either search and neutralize the lED or pre-initiate the same by sending (all) DTMF codes on the jammed signal.

(e) Approach 5: Targeting the Electric

Detonator. Our most ambitious approach was to target the electric detonator, with an ElectroMagnetic Pulse (EMP). The approach involved the generation of an EMP of sufficient magnitude that would induce an electric current in the wires of the electric detonator that should be sufficient to initiate the detonator. If this approach proved successful, we intended to bypass the RC IED and pre-initiate the detonator, directly. Such equipment situ demolitions.

DEVELOPMENT OF SOLUTIONS

Monitoring by the MO Directorate. These technical approaches were evolved over a period of time and were presented to the DGMO, on more than one occasion. The DGMO provided complete support; permitting me and my officers to travel anywhere in the country and also the required financial support. On one occasion, I gave a status update to the DGMO at New Delhi, in the presence of both the ADGMOs. At the conclusion of my presentation, the DGMO asked me, if I needed any other assistance from him, as he was proceeding on posting and would hereafter, not be directly involved with me. I remember telling him that since my officers and I had permission to travel and funding to support my work, I did not think I needed further support. He told me to reconsider the offer carefully. After 10 minutes he asked me again if I visualized any further assistance and I remember requesting him for a lap top computer, which amused him though he sanctioned the same immediately.

The reason I mention this incident, is because later I would regret not asking him for something that l would require, indeed.

All Round Progress. We applied ourselves with earnest to all the five technical approaches. Within a few weeks we made progress. In the 1s approach (spurious Frequency), we were able to detect the frequency and create the jamming signal but we needed to improve the range. In the 4th approach (Reactive Jamming), we identified an Indian firm that was able to specity the equipment and software required for the reactive jammer. In the 3rd approach (ASHI), we interacted with the Northern Command EME and offered to improve the equipment.

However, Northern Command EME was not keen on a collaborative effort but offered to implement our suggestions, by themselves. Our most remarkable success, however, came in the 2nd approach: the TAURUS Pre-initiator.

Financial Powers. The DGMO kept up to his word and we received Rs 50 Lakhs, a rather large sum at that time, under a fund called Field Practice & Training Grant (FP&TG). However, under the FP&TG rules, as a Commanding Officer (CO), I was empowered with financial powers for transactions of Rs 4,000 only. Even mathematically, this meant I would have to exercise my powers 1250 times to expend the amount! Now ! regretted not taking the DGMO's offer for assistance, more seriously. In the mean time, as is typical in the Army, all the Commanders in my chain (Brigade, Corps and Army), were replaced in routine transters.

For some weeks, taced anxious moments as we had committed liabilities and vendors were demanding payment. In the mean time, our prototypes were showing promise and I wrote to the erstwhile DGMO, now an Army Commander, informing him of our progress and requesting assistance, in making the payments. A tew weeks later, I was visited by the E-in-C, who reviewed the progress of the project and then agreed to clear the outstanding payments, under his powers. The E-in-C, has unlimited financial powers under FP&TG.

PART 3: UNPRECEDENTED SUCCESS

Assembly of the Equipment. (Technological Creativity in a Cook House). In retrospect, I must concede that initially the 2nd approach impressed me the least. Unlike the other approaches there was little creativity or ingenuity in its design. It simply involved broadcasting all the DTMF codes, on all the frequencies of the Citizen Band. The more powerful the broadcasting signal the better range we expected. Our initial efforts were in procuring generators, batteries, radio sets, antennae and a suitable microprocessor to control activities. The next step was to assemble the equipment, which involved making myriad of electrical connections, so that all the equipment functioned simultaneously and as per design. This arduous work was meticulously carried out in the cook house of 12 Field Company, because the accommodation was lying vacant; as we had dispatched more than a company strength on UN missions. After several days of burning midnight oil, I was informed that the equipment was finally assembled. We were at a mess function that evening and I remember requesting our ladies for a short period of absence. The officers and I drove over to the cook house to see the functional equipment, which we put on trial the very next day.

More Size for More Range. The TAURUS pre-initiator was in concept an adaptation of the EME ASHI equipment. We were prepared to sacrifice size and mobility, to obtain a more powerful pre-initiating signal. The ASHI had a small range and was battery operated. It was also reportedly unreliable, when the battery charge was low. During one of our discussions, I remember the DGMO telling me that even if we could get a range of five to six km, it would be of immense benefit, in the field. In order to improve range, we invested in a reliable power source, incorporated a specially designed antenna and used a battery of radio sets dedicated to individual spectra of the Citizen Band.

Preliminary Trials. We conducted preliminary trials in the Siwalik Golf Course (SGC), Chandimandir. We placed RC IEDs at calculated distances from the pre-initiator and then ran the equipment, to see if the IED got initiated. Initially, we placed the IEDs at 100m and then progressively increased the distances. We celebrated when the first lEDs got initiated; after all, we had succeeded in making an equipment that worked! When we crossed 6 Km, we were enthralled because we had achieved the DGMO's target; but the good news didn't end there. We crossed 10 Km,

12 Km and even 16 Km; the equipment appeared to have no range restrictions! Finally, we placed sample IEDs on the Ambala-Ludhiana highway and even these were activated. We knew we had a winner that had surpassed our most optimistic hopes.

DEPLOYMENT IN THE FIELD

Move to Srinagar. One of my proudest moments, was when I spoke to the Director MO-4 and told him about our resounding success. Naturally, he was inclined to believe that I was being optimistic and cautioned me notto unnecessarily arouse expectations. However, I was confident that the equipment would deliver much needed value and pressed for an aircraft courier to transport the equipment to Srinagar, for trials. A few days later, I received intimation that the equipment's performance was to be demonstrated to the Army Commander Western Command. The equipment was subsequently inspected by the Army Commander in SGC, Chandimandir and he waited patiently for the equipment to complete its cycle and witness all the planted IEDs, pre-initiate.

Convinced that we had a workable solution, the Army Commander congratulated us and within hours, thereafter, we received intimation that an IAF courier would transport us to Srinagar.

Demonstration. I travelled with a team from my regiment, by the courier to Srinagar. The following day we demonstrated the equipment in Badami Bagh. The Corps Commander and other officers witnessed our demonstration, after which the Corps Commander asked me to meet him, in his office. The Corps Commander was an experienced soldier, with a reputation for straight talking and it was the first time that I was meeting him, in person. The Corps Commander did not mince his words; he said he had little confidence in my 'fancy gadget' and he did not believe that solutions manufactured from the 'safe' confines of Delhi and Chandigarh, were practicable in the reality of Kashmir. I replied that I was confident of the equipment and that proof of the pudding lay in eating it! I suggested that the equipment be deployed in the most IED prone area and let the results speak for itself. The Corps Commander took time replying, finally saying there was a problem with that approach. When I asked him what the problem might be, he replied that I was obviously well known to the Army HQ and if I were deployed in a dangerous area and something happened to me, he would be hard pressed to give an explanation. We both laughed at the thought and I assured him that it was an occupational hazard that was worth the risk!

Trials. The equipment was put to trial by a local engineer regiment, at Pattan and its effectiveness was quickly proved. The trial team discovered that RC IEDs planted in Gulmarg, were activated by the equipment, from Pattan. The equipment was thereafter moved to Lirikpur, which was a particularly RC IED prone area. On the first day of the trial, the equipment was activated at 0300h, so as to clear the axes, before the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) search parties moved out. At about 0430h, a loud explosion was heard, which we discovered was the pre-initiation of a terrorist planted IED. Later, we received confirmation through an Electronic Warfare (EW) intercept that the local Hizbul Mujahedeen (HM) Commander had expressed his ire to the terrorist planting the IED (Cigarette Wala) that the IED had been initiated pre-maturely. The 'Cigarette Wala' tried to explain that he was not responsible for the early detonation, suggesting that the RC IED was perhaps defective. The next day, we switched on the equipment, at the same time and there were five successive explosions subsequently. This time the HM Commander was livid and the 'Cigarette Wala' was hard pressed to explain that the entire consignment was defective! With that our trial was concluded; we did not even take our trial equipment back. On the request of the local formation, our trial equipment continued to be operationally deployed.

Production. With the completion of the trial, I thought my task had been successfully completed. My mandate was to find a technological solution, which had been achieved. Now, the Army should find a way to produce and deploy the equipment, in sufficient numbers. A few weeks later, the Army Commander Northern Command called me to his headquarters, where he took a detailed briefing from me, on the entire project. He then told me that he wanted about 30 sets of equipment and asked me to produce the same. I told him that my mandate was only to produce a successful prototype and I did not have the authority to produce the equipment. Further, given that mine was a combat unit, belonging to the Western Command, it may not be appropriate for me to get involved in producing the equipment, for another command. I did, however, mention that I was ready to share the technology, train and assist engineer regiments of Northern Command in producing the equipment. We discussed other options for producing the equipment, after which the Army Commander thanked me and I returned to Chandigarh.

Amarnath Yatra-2001. A few weeks later, I received a telephone call from the Corps Commander at Srinagar. He said that he urgently needed four sets of the equipment that should be deployed before the annual Amarnath Yatra pilgrimage. I told him that I wasn't mandated to produce the equipment and that HQ Northern Command should be able to help with the matter. He laughed in his typical gregarious manner and told me that he had broached the subject with the Deputy PM, recently. He was confident that I would be receiving funds to produce the equipment, shortly. A few days later, the adjutant entered my office with a registered post from the DGP, J8K Police, in which he had found a demand draft for Rupees One Crore Seven Lakhs, payable to the CO,

7 Engineer Regiment! My seniors were not pleased with the violation of protocol and I had to spend time convincing them that I did not play a hand in the precipitation of these events. Eventually, I was given a go ahead to produce the equipment, which we did The equipment was produced and deployed before the commencement of the annual yatra. That was our last involvement in the direct production of the TAURUS pre-initiator. HQ Northern Command went on to procure more of the equipment for deployment in J&K.

PART 4: BEYOND TAURUS

After I relinquished the command of 7 Engineer Regiment, I went on to do the Higher Command Course, serve in important staff appointments, command a mountain brigade amongst other professional and challenging tenures. I was never again directly involved with the TAURUS equipment, but I did receive informal feedback. Many well wishers and soldiers told me about the success of the TAURUS but the most heartwarming incident was the one l would like to call, 'Providential Justice' The TAURUS pre-initiator was operated in the early hours of the morning, prior to soldiers moving out to secure the axes, popularly called 'Road Opening', in the Army. The TAURUS claimed the life of one terrorist and injured another, while they were attempting to lay an RCIED. When the RCIED is activated it is vulnerable to pre-initiation; in this particular case, the required DMF code was broadcast, while the terrorists were still in the danger area. Such incidents are excellent deterrents for terrorists, who will experience fear when handling the RC IED.

While developing the TAURUS equipment, I was often asked how long the counter would remain effective, before terrorists develop improvements. The first improvement, I thought, the terrorists would develop was to change from a 2-digit DTMF code to a 3-digit DTMF code. Such a change would make the new RC.

IED impervious to the 2-digit TAURUS pre-initiator. However, anticipating such a development we were prepared to change the software to broadcast 3-digit DTMF codes, using the same hardware (radio sets, antennae, power supply). The terrorist's ability to innovate, however, was much slower than we anticipated. It took more than two-years for the 3-digit RC IED to make an appearance and it didn't achieve the popularity of the 2-digit RC IED. It is also more difficult to initiate the 3-digit RC IED, particularly when one is attempting to target a moving vehicle.

Prior to my relinquishing command, we completed the construction of the Prototype of the Reactive Jammer (Approach 4). In our visualization, the Reactive Jammer was the equipment to protect mobile convoys and the equipment would continue to function effectively, even if terrorists were to change the 2-digit DTMF code. The Reactive Jammer had advantages over the Barrage Jammer, because the power of the lamming signal is concentrated on one specific frequency rather than the whole spectrum. Thus, besides offering better versatility and range, it also warned security forces about the presence of terrorists attempting to broadcast DTMF codes; to initiate an IED that has been temporarily incapacitated, by the automatically generated jamming signal. The equipment fitted in a Ashok Leyland Stallion vehicle was demonstrated to the Army Commander Northern Command and thereafter sent to Srinagar.

CONCLUSION

More than 13 years have passed since the time of this narration. The RC IED of the type prevalent at that time, are no longer in use by terrorists, in J&K. However, the TAURUS and the RC IED is only a battle, in the larger war we wage against IEDs. Both globally and nationally the IED threat has assumed menacing proportions. In 2015, our country experienced 268 IED explosions, claiming the live's of 117 of our citizens. The IED threat today is more pronounced in the North East (Manipur & Assam) and in the Naxal belt (Bihar, Chattisgarh & Jharkhand), than in J&K. There are important lessons that we can learn from the Indian Army's experience in J&K, worthy of application, in the North East and in the Naxal areas.